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Abstract
This paper analyses the eﬀects of trade liberalisation and technical change
on real and relative wages. It builds a model with monopolistic competi-
tion, heterogeneous ﬁrms and two countries, North and South, and solves it
numerically. Skill-biased technical change, caused by decreases in the price
of imported equipment as a result of reduced trade costs or falls in its world
price, tends to increase the relative wages of skilled workers. This increase
in the skill premium can occur even in skill-scarce developing countries, as
has often been observed in reality, even though Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects
pull the other way. What drives the rise in skilled wages when imported
equipment becomes cheaper is the rise in demand for skilled workers in the
most productive ﬁrms in each sector. Whether or not real unskilled wages
increase absolutely after trade liberalisation appears to depend on whether
trade costs are ad valorem or per-unit.
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During the last three decades, the wages of skilled workers relative to unskilled
workers have increased in both developed and developing countries (Anderson,
2005; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). According to the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson
(HOS) model of trade and the associated Stolper-Samuelson theorem, this is to
be expected in countries where skilled labour is an abundant factor relative to the
world average, both developed and, as it has been argued in the case of Latin
America (Wood, 1997), some developing countries. However, this ﬁnding is not
restricted to Latin American and other developing countries abundant in skilled
labour, but has been documented also for low-income Asian countries where un-
skilled labour is surely abundant.
This rise in relative skilled wages has not always hurt unskilled workers as there
is some evidence that real unskilled wages have risen (Wood, 2002), which may
have contributed to falling poverty rates especially in Asian countries (Chen and
Ravallion, 2008). However, in some developing countries unskilled wages fell in
real as well as relative terms, as in Mexico during the period 1984-1990 (Caselli,
2010).
In order to explain this rising wage diﬀerential, observed in both skill-abundant
and skill-scarce countries, diﬀerent strands of the economic literature have focused
on diﬀerent forces, particularly greater openness to trade and skill-biased technical
change. Openness to trade may have aﬀected wages not only through the Stolper-
Samuelson mechanism, but also through other channels, as argued by Feenstra
and Hanson (1997), Wood (2002), Epifani and Gancia (2008), Vannoorenberghe
(2008), Bustos (2009) and Ria˜ no (2009).
2Skill-biased technical change in this context usually refers to the idea that ﬁrms
in developing countries, particularly middle-income countries, import new tech-
nologies from developed countries, often in the form of machinery and equipment,
that increase the relative demand for skilled labour since they are complementary
with skills (Acemoglu, 2002a;b). Skill-biased technical change of this sort has been
referred to as pervasive (Berman and Machin, 2004).
The large body of theoretical studies on the subject, however, has not fully ex-
plained the generally observed facts: rising wage diﬀerentials in most developing
countries, whether they are skill-abundant or skill-scarce, accompanied by rising
real unskilled wages in most, but not all, cases. Some gaps remain to be ﬁlled.
First, relative wages need to be analysed together with changes in real wages of
both skilled and unskilled workers since the forces that determine them are likely to
be related (for instance, see Bernard et al., 2007). Second, all the determinants of
wages need to be included in the same model because interactions between them
could make these variables endogenous. For instance, Acemoglu (2002b; 2007)
makes skill-biased technical change endogenous and determined by trade liberali-
sation. Third, it remains to explore this topic in relation to the extensive research
on heterogeneous ﬁrms, following Melitz (2003), which has drawn attention to the
importance of within-sector structural eﬀects of trade, technical progress and other
shocks.
Motivated by these gaps, this paper seeks to construct a model that can explain
the generally observed facts mentioned above. The model refers to a small economy
with two traded sectors over the short run, with an extension for the long run.
It refers formally to a skill-scarce country, which is regarded as the standard case
3in the South, but the results would be even stronger for a skill-abundant country.
The paper extends the model and production function of Vannoorenberghe (2008)
to two sectors and two countries, a relatively skill-abundant North and relatively
skill-scarce South, as in Bernard et al. (2007), and includes equipment, which is
complementary to skilled workers and substitutable for unskilled workers, as a third
factor of production. Equipment is modelled as an intermediate good bought from
abroad and, therefore, its price is taken as exogenous. Firms are heterogeneous
and face a sunk cost upon entry, as well as ﬁxed costs for supplying the domestic
and export markets.
The form of the production function in the model assumes that ﬁrms are het-
erogeneous in the productivity of skilled labour, which matches some empirical
features emphasised in the literature. Not only does the model predict that ex-
porting ﬁrms are bigger and more productive, but also that they pay higher average
wages as a result of employing relatively more skilled workers, which conforms to
the results of Bernard and Jensen (1995; 1997) and Haltiwanger et al. (1999).
The model is mainly concerned with the eﬀects on the wages in each sector of
skilled and unskilled workers, following trade liberalisation and a decrease in the
price of imported equipment. Following other contributions to the literature, the
reduction in the price of equipment is referred to as ‘skill-biased technical change’,
although it does not imply a shift of the production function (‘technical progress’),
but rather a movement along it (‘a change in technique’). The fall in the price of
equipment may be due to lower variable trade costs or technical progress in the
developed country that produces and exports equipment, but technical progress
in the North is not modelled in this paper. Skilled and unskilled workers are
modelled alternatively as mobile and immobile across sectors, which are reasonable
4assumptions respectively for the long run and the short run.
This paper contributes to the literature on the eﬀects of trade liberalisation
on wages and the role of heterogeneous ﬁrms in trade. As in Bernard et al.
(2007), its framework can accommodate several diﬀerent eﬀects on wages. One
of these, as in the HOS model, is that falling trade costs cause a rise in the real
reward of the abundant factor and a decline in the real reward of the scarce factor.
A second inﬂuence on real wages relates to consumers’ taste for variety. Trade
liberalisation makes foreign varieties available to consumers, as in Helpman and
Krugman (1985). This increase in product variety reduces consumer price indices
and raises real income. Another inﬂuence on real wages is endogenous changes in
industry-level productivity, as analysed by Bernard et al. (2007). Higher average
ﬁrm productivity increases average ﬁrm size and reduces the mass of domestically
produced varieties, leading to a reduction in the price of the average variety and,
possibly, overall real wage increases for both the abundant and the scarce factor of
production, although the abundant factor still gains in relative terms. In Bernard
et al. (2007), this eﬀect is stronger in the sector that uses the abundant factor of
production more intensively and, therefore, leads to a magniﬁcation of comparative
advantage.
Vannoorenberghe (2008) highlights another channel through which a decrease
in variable trade costs can aﬀect the skill premium, also present in this model. In
a model with two identical countries and ﬁrm heterogeneity in the productivity
of skilled labour, trade liberalisation leads the most productive and skill-intensive
ﬁrms to expand their export sales while the least productive ﬁrms are driven out
of the domestic market. The expansion of the most productive ﬁrms and the
contraction of the least productive ﬁrms have a positive eﬀect on the relative
5demand for skilled labour. The impact of new entry into the export market may
be positive or negative depending on the productivity of newly exporting ﬁrms
relative to that of the average ﬁrm. Vannoorenberghe (2008) shows that this
last eﬀect cannot compensate for the other two and, therefore, that a decrease in
variable trade costs increases the skill premium.
Two recent papers study the links between trade and technology adoption and
are, therefore, more closely related to the present paper. Ria˜ no (2009) develops and
estimates a structural model of trade and technology adoption with heterogeneous
ﬁrms. Firms produce using skilled and unskilled labour and can choose between
two technologies: a ‘traditional’ technology characterised by high marginal costs
but low ﬁxed costs, and a ‘modern’ technology that has low marginal costs but
requires a high ﬁxed cost of operation. By identifying plants that purchase im-
ported machinery and equipment as users of modern technology, Ria˜ no predicts a
response of technology adoption and the skill premium to a unilateral trade liber-
alisation of a similar magnitude to the one that actually occurred in Mexico after
1985. In the baseline model, he ﬁnds that trade liberalisation leads to an increase
in the relative demand for skills and an increase in the skill premium of around
2.4 percent. When he allows for the cheaper sunk cost of technology adoption due
to falling import tariﬀs, the skill premium rises by 4.2 percent following trade lib-
eralisation. Ria˜ no’s model is similar to that of Bustos (2009), except that Bustos’
model is static, assumes that skilled and unskilled labour are perfect complements
in production and does not allow for the possibility of cheaper technology due to
falling import tariﬀs. However, while in these two papers there are only two tech-
nologies characterised by the trade-oﬀ between ﬁxed and marginal cost, the model
in the present paper uses a continuous measure of technology adoption that allows
6for the fact that larger and more productive ﬁrms expand more in absolute terms
while all ﬁrms may upgrade skills and technology. This is an important character-
istic of the new channel presented in this paper through which trade liberalisation
can aﬀect wages.
This paper also contributes to the literature on capital-skill complementarity,
more speciﬁcally equipment-skill complementarity, and, related to this, it iden-
tiﬁes a further eﬀect of trade liberalisation on wages. Decreases in the price of
imported equipment due to reductions in trade costs lead to higher demand for
skilled workers, the complementary factor in production, and, thus, to increases
in their earnings. This implies that, even where unskilled labour is the abundant
factor of production in developing countries, there can be overall increases in the
real wage of skilled workers and in wage inequality following trade liberalisation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out a standard
HOS model with skilled and unskilled labour, adding imported equipment as a
third factor of production. While this simple model has some interesting features,
in particular that trade liberalisation can lead to cheaper equipment and higher
real wages for skilled workers in developing countries, it is not able to show how
skilled labour, the scarce factor in most developing countries, can gain relatively.
Section 3 develops a model with heterogeneous ﬁrms, monopolistic competition and
either immobile or mobile labour across sectors, and derives the main equations
that characterise its general equilibrium. Section 4 solves the model with numerical
simulations, since it is too complicated to be solved analytically. This section shows
how real and relative wages in each sector are aﬀected by both trade liberalisation
in ﬁnal goods and skill-biased technical change, caused by a decrease in the price
7of imported equipment, due to lower trade costs on equipment and/or a decrease
in its world price. Section 5 concludes.
2 Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson extended
This section introduces imported equipment as a third factor of production into
a standard HOS model with skilled and unskilled labour and two sectors (see, for
instance, Wood, 1994). There are two countries, North and South, and North is











where subscripts s and u refer to skilled and unskilled labour and superscripts
N and S to North and South. In what follows, superscripts are omitted where
unnecessary since the focus of the model is on the South.






which implies that every consumer spends a share α of their income on good 1
and 1 − α on good 2. Perfectly competitive ﬁrms in sector i produce output Y






where γ1 >γ 2, which implies that sector 1 is skilled-labour intensive. While
8skilled (S) and unskilled (U) labour are modelled as substitutes, skilled labour
and imported equipment (K) are modelled as perfect complements by assuming
that
Si = aKi, (1)
where a is the same in both sectors. If a = 1, then each skilled worker would
need one ‘machine’, eg. a computer. The way equipment is introduced in this
model is related to that of Krusell et al. (2000), with the diﬀerence that in their
framework equipment-skill complementarity is modelled by making equipment and
skilled labour less substitutable than skilled and unskilled labour in their CES
production function. Firms maximise proﬁts, given by
πi = PiYi − Ci = Pi (aKi)
γi U
1−γi
i − wsaKi − wuUi − rkKi,
where Pi is the price of each good i, Ci denotes the total cost function and ws,
wu and rk are the factor prices for skilled labour, unskilled labour and equipment
respectively. The price of equipment is rk ≡ rS
k = rN
k · τ,w h e r erN
k is the price of
equipment in the North and τ represents iceberg trade costs and is greater than
1. Equilibrium in factor markets requires the sum of the demands for each factor
in the two sectors to equal the ﬁxed supply of that factor in the economy,
¯ L = L1 + L2 for L = {S,U}.
This implies that workers can move freely across sectors and that wages are
equalised across sectors.
9Assuming perfect competition, proﬁt maximisation yields the following two



















where Γi = γ
−γi
i (1 − γi)
γi−1 and is constant. This system of equations has a unique


































where γ = γ1 (1 − γ2)−γ2 (1 − γ1)=γ1−γ2 > 0. As measured by the ratio of the










































it is convenient to assume that α1 = α2 =0 .5a n dt h a td l n P1 = −dlnP2,s o
that changes in nominal wages as determined above can be interpreted as changes
in real wages. In the South, trade liberalisation causes P1 to decrease and P2 to
increase because this country is relatively abundant in unskilled labour, which is
used more intensively in sector 2, as well as a decrease in rk. As in the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, the above equations show that ws decreases and wu increases,
10thus reducing wage inequality. However, the decrease in the price of equipment at
Home partly oﬀsets the decrease in ws and, thus, wage inequality through a higher
demand for equipment and hence for skilled labour.1
The decrease in the price of equipment can be interpreted as skill-biased tech-
nical change and is equivalent to factor-biased technical change in both sectors ` al a
Jones (1965). Overall, wage inequality and skilled wages still decrease due to the
magniﬁcation eﬀect of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, whose eﬀect is therefore
larger than that of the lower price of equipment. On the other hand, a reduction
in the price of equipment in the North, caused by exogenous technical progress,
tends to increase both skilled wages and wage inequality and has no substantial
eﬀect on real unskilled wages.2
Even though this simple framework is able to explain the increase in real un-
skilled wages that has occurred in some developing countries following trade lib-
eralisation, it is not able to show other interesting patterns that are found in the
data. In particular, it cannot explain the increase in the relative wages of skilled
workers that has happened even in those developing countries where unskilled
labour is relatively abundant. Moreover, it excludes the possibility of within-
sector reallocation of resources, which has been shown to be an important part of
the reallocation of resources following trade liberalisation (see Caselli, 2010; Bus-
tos, 2009; and Meschi et al., 2009). The next section provides a more complete
framework.
1The eﬀect is as if skilled workers had to buy their own computers and thus gained from them
being cheaper.
2There might be some second-order eﬀects through changes in the goods prices that are not
considered here because they do not change the story qualitatively.
113 Equipment-skill complementarity with heterogeneous ﬁrms
This section extends the model to include equipment-skill complementarity within
a ‘new new’ trade theory framework with heterogeneous ﬁrms and monopolis-
tic competition. The model follows Bernard et al. (2007) and Vannoorenberghe
(2008), but with substantial diﬀerences. Two cases regarding labour mobility
across sectors are developed. The ﬁrst case assumes that workers can move freely
across sectors, as in standard HOS theory, which is relevant for analysis of the
long run. The second case assumes that workers are immobile across sectors, even
though they can still move across ﬁrms within industries, implying a move from an
HOS model to a speciﬁc-factor model and to an analysis of the short run, focusing
on within-sector reallocation of resources among ﬁrms.
There are several reasons why workers can move more easily across ﬁrms within
industries than across industries. Labour legislation in most developing countries
as well as many other things, including housing and family ties, can severely limit
the possibility of labour mobility across sectors in the short and medium run (Goh
and Javorcik, 2007). If sectors are geographically clustered, it also means that it is
easier for workers to move across ﬁrms within an industry as all ﬁrms belonging to
that industry are located close to each other. Industry-speciﬁc skills are an even
more compelling reason for immobility of labour. Since it takes time and money
to acquire the skills needed in a particular sector, it is more likely that a worker
can ﬁnd a new job within their industry than in a diﬀerent sector.
The model retains the assumption that equipment and skilled labour are not
only perfectly complementary, and that the relationship between the two is strictly
linear, as assumed in the previous section (see equation (1)). The ﬁnal section
12discusses the relaxation of this assumption.
3.1 Consumers
The model assumes that preferences are homothetic and that the representative
consumer’s utility depends on consumption of the output of the two industries,
i, each of which contains a large number of diﬀerentiated varieties, φ, produced
by heterogeneous ﬁrms. Country superscripts are omitted unless necessary. The







The lower tier of utility determining consumption of varieties takes a constant


















where Ci is the consumption index deﬁned over consumption of individual varieties,
ci(φ), with the dual price index, Pi, deﬁned over prices of varieties, pi(φ).  >1i s
the consumers’ elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent varieties and is assumed
for simplicity to be the same in both sectors. Maximisation by consumers yields
the standard condition stating that the relative demand of all varieties for which











In each sector i = {1,2} there is a continuum of ﬁrms, each producing a diﬀerent
variety φ, which also represents the ﬁrm-speciﬁc skilled-labour productivity pa-
rameter. Production uses three factors, skilled labour s, unskilled labour u and
equipment k. Skilled and unskilled labour are both in ﬁxed aggregate supply,
i.e. there is no skill acquisition, and equipment is modelled as an intermediate
good imported from abroad at a ﬁxed price because the Home country is small




















where φ appears in the ﬁrst term because it aﬀects the productivity only of skilled
labour and σ>1 is the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled
labour and, for simplicity, is assumed to be the same for all sectors.3 By contrast,
skilled labour and equipment are perfectly complementary in production,
si = aki. (6)
Firms are heterogeneous in the productivity of their skilled labour and, thus,
3See Acemoglu (2002b) for a review of the empirical evidence estimating the parameter σ to
be between 1 and 2. Behar (2009) estimates this parameter to be equal to 2.
14also of their equipment, indexed by φ ∈ (1,Φ), which is the realisation of a ran-
dom variable, drawn from an exogenously given continuous distribution, G(φ).
The assumption that φ ≥ 1 simpliﬁes the analysis because it implies that skilled
labour is at least as productive as unskilled labour. Intuitively, there exist diﬀer-
ent production technologies in a sector and ﬁrms choose how exactly they want
to mix unskilled labour with skilled labour and equipment, depending on their
skilled-labour productivity parameter value and on factor prices.
Firms can sell their product on their domestic market (subscript d), as well
as on the export market (subscript x).4 Production in each market involves ﬁxed
costs, which are equal across ﬁrms of the same country and sector. This generates
increasing returns to scale, as in standard models of monopolistic competition.
Firms pay ﬁxed costs of domestic production, fd, and of exporting, fx,i nt e r m s
of f, at a unit price rf. Since this model is static, f should not be interpreted
as capital, but rather as an initial payment to management consultants for the
development of a business plan. These management consultants are a separate
group of people whose other behaviour is not included in the present model. Fixed
costs are such that fx >f d, which is a standard assumption given that the costs of
doing business abroad are larger due to the extra costs of learning a legal system,
language, etc. There are also variable international trade costs, τi ≥ 1, assumed to
be of iceberg form (so that τ is the multiple of goods that must be produced in order
for one unit of the good to arrive at its destination). These variable trade costs
can be interpreted as tariﬀs and/or transportation costs and they can be levied on
ﬁnal goods (subscript o), or on imported equipment (subscript n). The Appendix
4The model assumes that there are only two countries, Home (superscript H)a n dF o r e i g n
(superscript F). Due to symmetry in the production processes, the focus of the following analysis
can be put on exports from Home in order to analyse imports from Foreign.
15shows how the model changes if trade costs are assumed to be “per-unit”, i.e. non-
proportional to prices and costs of production, following Wood (2007; 2008) and
Irarrazabal et al. (2010).
The proﬁts from selling on the domestic or on the export market are given by:
πim(φ)=pim(φ)cim(φ) − wsisim(φ) − wuiuim(φ) − rkikim(φ) − rffm, (7)
where pim(φ) is the price at which a ﬁrm with characteristics φ in sector i sells
its products in market m = {d,x}. wsi and wui are, respectively, the wages of
skilled and unskilled labour in sector i,a n drki ≡ rH
ki = rF
ki · τH
ni is the price of
equipment, equal to the price of this input in the foreign country times the iceberg
variable trade cost. cim(φ) denotes consumption in each market. Therefore, the





where yim(φ) denotes production aimed at each sector and market. Using either (8)
























16Price is the marginal cost of production times a markup, which is a standard result
in models with monopolistic competition. A decrease in the price of equipment,
due to either an exogenous price reduction abroad or a decrease in tariﬀs at Home,
leads to a lower unit cost of production and, thus, in the price of the good produced.
This decrease is greater for a ﬁrm with a higher productivity level, φ,w h i c hi sa n
important result in this model.
Firms which draw low φ may make negative proﬁts and exit the market, ei-
ther the export market only or both the domestic and export markets given the
assumption that fx >f d. Thus, one needs to analyse the cutoﬀ ﬁrm, i.e. the ﬁrm
whose productivity draw allows it to break even. φ 
id is deﬁned as the cutoﬀ level
of φ i nt h ed o m e s t i cm a r k e ta n dφ 








Using equations (5), (7), (8) and (10), input use and production level can be
derived for the cutoﬀ ﬁrm in the domestic market in each sector:
yi(φ
 


























































is the marginal cost
for ﬁrm φ 
id. Similar expressions can be derived for factor use and production
for the cutoﬀ ﬁrm in the export market by using (9) instead of (8) and (11)
instead of (10) and, therefore, substituting fx for fd, φ 
ix for φ 
















id). Factor use and production
of the cutoﬀ ﬁrms increase with ﬁxed costs because higher ﬁxed costs require a
ﬁrm to sell more in order to break even. A higher elasticity of substitution in
the utility function puts downward pressure on the markup, which forces ﬁrms to
sell more. A lower unit cost of production decreases the sales price more than it
decreases costs due to the markup and forces the cutoﬀ ﬁrm to produce more.
3.3 The goods market
Production and factor use of each ﬁrm can be expressed as a function of that of
the cutoﬀ ﬁrm in order to simplify the analysis and to describe the factor use and
production schedules for the whole economy.
From the consumers’ side of the economy, the relative consumption condition
(4) for φ  = φ 











Using (8), (10) and (16), production for the domestic market in sector i of ﬁrm











18Using (12) for yi(φ 
id), one can rewrite the above expression for production for the
domestic market, (17), as




The higher the φ a ﬁrm draws, the lower is its marginal cost and the more it
produces. The same procedure can be applied to the factor inputs:
























































Using equations (22), (10) and (11), the ratio of export sales to domestic sales for















∀ φ ≥ φ
 
ix (24)
This ratio is a positive function of the size of the Foreign market relative to the
19Home market and a negative function of trade costs. Production for the export













Using this expression and the equivalent of (12) for the export market, the level
of production for the export market becomes:




Similarly to the expression for production for the domestic market, the higher the
φ a ﬁrm draws, the more it produces for the export market because its marginal
cost is lower. Expressions for the factor inputs can be derived in a similar fashion:

























In equations (26)-(29), variable trade costs aﬀect not only the price of equipment at
Home (rki = rF
ki·τH
ni), but also the other factor prices because in general equilibrium
these depend on variable trade costs.
From the above expressions for production and factor inputs for the domestic











A similar expression holds for proﬁts in the export market, derived from the equiv-










Proﬁts increase in φ and are equal to zero for the cutoﬀ ﬁrm. This result holds for
both the domestic and the export market. It ensures that only relatively produc-
tive, skill- and equipment-intensive ﬁrms export. Exporting ﬁrms employ propor-
tionately more skilled labour and equipment than non-exporting ﬁrms and, there-
fore, pay higher wages on average to their workers and have a higher equipment-
unskilled labour ratio.5 This conforms with the empirical evidence presented by
Bernard and Jensen (1995) and Leonardi (2007). Exporting ﬁrms also produce
more, and have a higher φ, which is consistent with the evidence of Bernard and
Jensen (1997) that they are more technology intensive.
























5Given the simple relationship that I assume between equipment and skilled labour, I concen-
trate on the equipment-unskilled labour ratio. The same result applies for the equipment-labour
ratio, but with a smaller magnitude.
21The interval (φ 
id,φ  
ix) in which ﬁrms produce only for their domestic market in-
creases with the diﬀerence between the ﬁxed costs in the two markets and with
higher variable trade costs. Both eﬀects are due to the fact that higher barriers
to international trade result in a lower proportion of exporters and a higher cutoﬀ
level for the export market. This leads to higher overall proﬁts, which implies that
more ﬁrms can break even in the domestic market, thus lowering the cutoﬀ level in
the domestic market and increasing the distance between the two cutoﬀs. Equiva-
lently, a larger Home market relative to the Foreign market implies that only more
productive ﬁrms are able to break even in the export market and, therefore, the
interval increases.
3.4 Equilibrium conditions
As in Melitz (2003) and the following literature, the number of ﬁrms in the market
is endogenous. An unbounded pool of ex-ante identical ﬁrms in each sector, Mi =
M, decides to enter the market by paying a ﬁxed sunk cost, fe, equal across ﬁrms
and sectors, paid in terms of f, at a unit price rf. Upon entering the market,
ﬁrms draw their productivity level, φ ∈ (1,Φ). After drawing their ﬁrm-speciﬁc
productivity parameter, ﬁrms decide whether to stay in the market and produce
or exit the market, depending on their proﬁts as described above. Therefore, there
is net entry up to the point where the expected proﬁts of entering are equal to
the sunk entry cost. Equivalently, in equilibrium total industry proﬁts, in both
domestic and export markets, must equal total entry costs, including those of ﬁrms










22Two alternative assumptions about labour mobility are explored. (1) When work-




















Skilled and unskilled labour markets in each sector clear when the supply of each
factor, ﬁxed in each sector and denoted by ui and si, is equal to total demand for
that factor, arising from production for the domestic and the export markets and
given by (19), (27), (20) and (28).
(2) When the two types of workers can move freely across sectors, the labour





























Wages are equalised across sectors, which implies that the sector subscripts for
factor prices can be dropped.
Similarly, the market for f, the initial payment to management consultants for








id))Mfd +( 1− G(φ
 
ix))Mfx]+2 Mfe. (38)
23Thus, general equilibrium in this economy is deﬁned by the goods market equi-
librium in each sector (33) × 2, unskilled labour market clearing in each sector
(34) × 2 or (36), skilled labour market clearing in each sector (35) × 2 or (37),
market clearing for management consultants payments f (38), conditions relating
the two productivity cutoﬀs in each sector at Home (32) × 2, deﬁnitions of sector
price indices (3) that include prices of imported varieties and τH
oi × 2, deﬁnition
of total expenditure at Home (23), a condition equating total expenditure to total
income, and a trade balance condition that includes equipment imports. Total
income includes payments to the management consultants f, who are assumed to
be a separate group of agents in the economy. All the other variables of inter-
est are functions of the above endogenous variable or, given the assumption of a
small economy, are taken as exogenous since the eﬀects would be too small to be
measured, eg. P F
i and EF.
4 Numerical simulations
An analytical solution to this model was attempted by solving for relative skilled
wages and relative cutoﬀs in the two sectors. However, the inclusion of equipment
as a third factor of production and the fact that equipment enters additively with
skilled wages made it impossible to ﬁnd such solution.
The paper, therefore, relies on numerical simulations to analyse how trade
liberalisation and cheaper equipment aﬀect real and relative wages in this model.
Numerical solutions have the advantage of providing a sense of the magnitude
of the shocks analysed, but the results generated with them cannot be deemed
general. In particular, the results that are described in this section are restricted
24to a small range of scenarios because ﬁnding a numerical solution becomes more
diﬃcult the further away the parameters are from the baseline case. Thus it cannot
be ruled out that results change substantially with a diﬀerent range of parameters,
even though this does not seem likely.
Following the literature (see Melitz, 2003 and Bernard et al., 2007), a gener-












where ξ is the shape parameter, ς is the scale parameter and μ is the location
parameter. I assume that μ =1a n dt h a tς = ξ =0 .168, so that this is equivalent to
a Pareto distribution. As shown in the above literature, this distribution provides
a reasonable approximation to observed variation in ﬁrm productivity.
Following Bernard et al. (2007) and subsequent studies, the consumers’ elas-
ticity of substitution across varieties,  , is set at 3.8 in both sectors. The elasticity
of substitution between factors in the production function, σ, is set at 1.5 in both
sectors, in the range suggested by Acemoglu (2002b). These values are also con-
sistent with the assumption of Vannoorenberghe (2008) that  >σ . Fixed entry
costs, fe, are set equal to 1, ﬁxed production costs for the domestic market, fd,
equal to 1, and ﬁxed production costs for the export market, fx, equal to 3 in
both sectors. For simplicity, the factor of proportion between skilled labour and
equipment, a, is set at 1. This is a strong assumption because it implies a lin-
ear relationship between skilled labour and equipment, but it simpliﬁes the model
signiﬁcantly. The number of skilled and unskilled workers in the economy in the




u2, which is consistent with the
assumption that sector 1 is the skill-intensive sector (γ1 =0 .6 >γ 2 =0 .4). It is
also assumed that, prior to the shocks that will be analysed, the economy is in
long-term equilibrium so that factor prices are equalised across sectors. Prices in








2 , which is consistent with the assump-
tion that Home is unskilled labour abundant, i.e. sH
uH < sF





i=1 ui. The price index P is a geometric mean of the two sector-level price
indices with weights determined by α, the proportion of income spent on varieties
of good 1, assumed to be equal to 0.5. Finally, the size of the Home economy is set
at approximately one hundredth of that of the Foreign economy, consistent with
the assumption that Home is a small, partially open, economy.
Given these assumptions, the paper next turns to the analysis of the response
of real and relative wages to reductions in variable trade costs, τ, and in the price
of equipment in the Foreign country, rF
ki.
4.1 Trade liberalisation and cheaper equipment
The following tables analyse changes in real unskilled and skilled wages and relative
skilled wages following trade liberalisation showing the results of several experi-
ments in order to disentangle the various eﬀects at work. The baseline case is when
iceberg trade costs are equal to 1.5 in both sectors (subscripts 1 and 2) in both
countries (superscripts H and F) and for equipment (subscript n) and ﬁnal goods
(subscript o). In table 1, trade liberalisation is modelled as a decrease of iceberg
trade costs from 1.5 to 1.4, while table 2 shows the eﬀects of assuming per-unit
trade costs, which decrease from 0.5 to 0.4. It is further assumed that the foreign
price of equipment, rF
ki, stays the same and is equal to 1 in both sectors.
26Table 1: Eﬀects of general trade liberalisation with mobile and immobile labour.
Baseline Mobile L Immobile L
τH
ni 1.5 1.4 1.4
τH
oi 1.5 1.4 1.4
τF
oi 1.5 1.4 1.4
ws1 1.000 0.992 1.017
ws2 1.000 0.992 0.976
ws1/P 28.841 29.940 30.667
ws2/P 28.841 29.940 29.471
wu1 0.599 0.543 0.546
wu2 0.599 0.543 0.541
wu1/P 17.274 16.444 16.536
wu2/P 17.274 16.444 16.379
wi1 (ws1/wu1) 1.670 1.815 1.849
wi2 (ws2/wu2) 1.670 1.815 1.794
var(k/u)1 ∗ 100 0.622 0.656 0.647
var(k/u)2 ∗ 1000 0.480 0.484 0.490
(s(φ ≥ 3)/s)1 0.771 0.765 0.764
(s(φ ≥ 3)/s)2 0.242 0.224 0.223
P 0.035 0.033 0.033
Table 1 shows how several key variables, including wages, change following
trade liberalisation under the two alternative assumptions of labour mobility and
immobility. The wage outcome in the two sectors when labour is mobile is simply
a weighted average of the result in each sector when labour is immobile as work-
ers move across sectors until wages are equalised. Therefore, the discussion and
tables 3 onwards will focus on the case of immobile labour. Nominal skilled wages
decrease slightly in sector 2, but increase on average by 4% in real terms due to
substantial decreases in the price indices. Nominal unskilled wages decrease, which
is in sharp contrast to the Stolper-Samuelson prediction for a developing country
relatively abundant in unskilled labour. However, due to the decrease in the price
indices, real unskilled wages decrease only by a small amount.
27Price indices decrease for several reasons. The decrease in τD
oi makes prices
of Foreign varieties lower, leading to lower price indices. The increase in Foreign
varieties means that there are more varieties overall, which lowers price indices
with a CES utility function, although this eﬀect is oﬀset by the decrease in Home
varieties. Finally, the increase in average productivity, caused by less productive
ﬁrms exiting the domestic market and consequently the rise in the domestic market
cutoﬀ, also leads to lower price indices since average prices go down. The decrease
in the price indices due to the increase in Foreign varieties may be larger in this
model than estimated for the US by Broda and Weinstein (2006) because the
present result refers to a small country that trades with a large country with many
more varieties.
It seems striking that real unskilled wages decrease in this model following
trade liberalisation given that HOS theory predicts that they should increase in
a developing country that is relatively abundant in unskilled labour.6 This result
is altered when trade costs are modelled per-unit rather than iceberg, as in table
2. In this case, not only is the increase in nominal and real skilled wages larger,
but real unskilled wages rise too. The reason for this result is that larger ﬁrms are
disproportionally penalised by per-unit trade costs, which add proportionally more
to the costs and hence prices of higher productivity ﬁrms than of lower productivity
ﬁrms. Unskilled labour intensive and lower-productivity ﬁrms produce and export
more when variable trade costs are per-unit. This ineﬃciency is reduced when
per-unit variable trade costs decrease, which leads wages of both types of workers
6Evidence shows that in some developing countries real unskilled wages have indeed decreased,
as in Mexico during the period 1985-1990 (Caselli, 2010). However, a decrease in real un-
skilled wages would be predicted by HOS theory if the developing country in question were
skill-abundant, as has been argued for Mexico (Wood, 1997).
28Table 2: Eﬀects of general trade liberalisation with mobile and immobile labour
and per-unit trade costs.
Baseline Mobile L Immobile L
tH
ni 0.5 0.4 0.4
tH
oi 0.5 0.4 0.4
tF
oi 0.5 0.4 0.4
ws1 1.000 1.053 1.063
ws2 1.000 1.053 1.040
ws1/P 26.019 28.746 29.011
ws2/P 26.019 28.746 28.420
wu1 0.699 0.686 0.688
wu2 0.699 0.686 0.682
wu1/P 18.187 18.794 18.832
wu2/P 18.187 18.794 18.665
wi1 (ws1/wu1) 1.431 1.532 1.543
wi2 (ws2/wu2) 1.431 1.532 1.524
var(k/u)1 ∗ 100 0.620 0.631 0.627
var(k/u)2 ∗ 1000 0.728 0.836 0.831
(s(φ ≥ 3)/s)1 0.668 0.662 0.662
(s(φ ≥ 3)/s)2 0.116 0.107 0.107
P 0.038 0.036 0.036
to increase. This conﬁrms the ﬁndings in Irarrazabal et al. (2010) that a reduction
in per-unit trade costs is an additional source of gains from trade, since distortions
are eliminated not only in international markets but also in the domestic market.
The increase in skilled wages combined with the tendency for a decrease or
smaller increase in unskilled wages clearly leads to an increase in the skill premium
and wage inequality, which is consistent with the evidence found in most developing
countries, independent of whether they are skill abundant or skill scarce, in the
last three decades (Anderson, 2005; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007).
The magniﬁcation of comparative advantage observed in Bernard et al. (2007) is
not present in this model. In their model, this magniﬁcation eﬀect is a consequence
29of low-productivity ﬁrms exiting the market in the comparative advantage sector.
However, in the present model, the introduction of equipment as a third factor of
production and the fact that ﬁrm heterogeneity is modelled in terms of productivity
of skilled labour imply that there is more scope for productivity increases in the
skill- and equipment-intensive sector as a consequence of low-productivity ﬁrms
exiting the domestic market. This can be observed by the fact that the changes
discussed above are larger in the skill- and equipment-intensive sector 1, which is
the comparatively disadvantaged sector.7
In order to understand the reasons behind the increase in relative skilled wages,
the next two tables show, respectively, the eﬀects of lower variable trade costs
only on imported equipment at Home and only on ﬁnal goods in both countries.
Table 3 simulates the eﬀects of trade liberalisation with respect only to imported
equipment at Home. In this table, substantial increases in nominal and real skilled
wages and in the skill premium can be observed. Both real skilled wages and the
skill premium increase on average by approximately 7.5%.
The reason for the increase in skilled wages, which pushes the skill premium up,
is that as variable trade costs on equipment fall, the price of equipment decreases
and demand for it increases. Firms with higher productivity are favoured because
they use equipment more intensively and increase their demand for equipment by
more. Since the model assumes equipment-skill complementarity, their demand
for skilled workers, relative to unskilled workers, will also increase by more. As
these large ﬁrms increase the demand for skilled labour, skilled wages increase.
7Table 5 in the Appendix shows the case in which trade liberalisation is carried out separately
in the two sectors assuming immobile labour across sectors. The last column in this table shows
that when trade liberalisation is carried out only in one of the two sectors, both skilled and
unskilled wages tend to increase more in the skill- and equipment-intensive sector, conﬁrming
that the magniﬁcation of comparative advantage is not present in this model.
30Table 3: Eﬀects of lower variable trade costs on imported equipment at Home
with immobile labour.
Baseline Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 & 2
τH
n1 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4
τH
n2 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4
τH
o1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
τH
o2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
τF
o1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
τF
o2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
ws1 1.000 1.090 0.990 1.083
ws2 1.000 0.976 1.075 1.051
ws1/P 28.841 31.528 26.659 31.431
ws2/P 28.841 28.252 31.119 30.501
wu1 0.599 0.596 0.596 0.594
wu2 0.599 0.592 0.591 0.584
wu1/P 17.274 17.245 17.251 17.238
wu2/P 17.274 17.125 17.120 16.954
wi1 (ws1/wu1) 1.670 1.828 1.661 1.823
wi2 (ws2/wu2) 1.670 1.650 1.817 1.797
var(k/u)1 ∗ 100 0.622 0.623 0.622 0.623
var(k/u)2 ∗ 1000 0.480 0.480 0.481 0.481
(s(φ ≥ 3)/s)1 0.771 0.772 0.771 0.772
(s(φ ≥ 3)/s)2 0.242 0.242 0.243 0.243
P 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.034
Moreover, cheaper equipment lowers the unit cost of production, which decreases
the sales price more than costs due to the markup. This forces the domestic cutoﬀ
ﬁrm to produce more, which pushes the low-productivity ﬁrms out of the domestic
market.
Table 6 in the Appendix analyses changes in unskilled and skilled wages and
relative skilled wages following an exogenous decrease in the world price of equip-
ment rF
ki. The simulations assume that the world price of equipment decreases
from the initial value of 1 to 0.9, corresponding to a 10% drop. International vari-
able trade costs remain equal to the baseline case of 1.5 and it is assumed that
31labour is immobile. Both nominal and real skilled wages increase following the
decrease in the price of equipment, and the skill premium increases on average by
approximately 11.5%. Slight decreases are observed in the real wages of unskilled
workers. These results are similar to the case analysed in table 3, where variable
trade costs on imported equipment decreased. The reason is that in both cases
they lead to a decrease in the price of equipment at Home, with the only diﬀerence
being that in the simulations in table 6 ﬁrms in the Foreign country can also access
equipment at a lower price.
The new mechanism by which cheaper imported equipment increases skilled
wages and the skill premium can be analysed in a diﬀerent way by examining
the variance across ﬁrms within each sector of the ratio of equipment to unskilled
labour. This variable and its relatives, such as the within-sector variance in the
equipment-labour ratio, are important determinants of relative skilled wages, as
shown by Leonardi (2007), and can be interpreted as measures of skill-biased tech-
nical change. This paper uses the equipment to unskilled labour ratio because
the model allows for more variation in this ratio. The variation in the equipment-
labour ratio, on the other hand, is smaller because the model assumes perfect
complementarity between skilled labour and equipment in order to remain more
tractable. This assumption, however, implies that there is a perfectly linear rela-
tionship between equipment and skilled labour.
When the price of equipment decreases, high-productivity ﬁrms increase their
demand for it. As mentioned above, this pushes low-productivity ﬁrms out of the
domestic market because the domestic cutoﬀ increases. This shows up in the data
as an increase in the variance of the equipment-unskilled labour ratio (var(k/u)),
even though in the sector as a whole the equipment-unskilled labour ratio stays
32the same. This mechanism can be interpreted as skill-biased technical change.
In tables 3 and 6, the change in the within-sector variance of the equipment-
unskilled labour ratio is rather small compared to the change in the same variable
in tables 1 and 4 (which simulates the eﬀects of trade liberalisation in ﬁnal goods
only). This is a consequence of the simplistic assumption of perfect complemen-
tarity between skilled labour and equipment, which does not allow for as much
intra-sectoral reallocation as it could be observed in reality and, thus, understates
the eﬀects analysed in this model.
The role of larger ﬁrms in increasing the demand for equipment can also be seen
by examining the share of skilled workers employed by the largest ﬁrms, i.e. those
with a productivity parameter φ ≥ 3, in each sector, deﬁned as (s(φ>3)/s)
in the tables. While this variable tends to decrease in the case of a general trade
liberalisation (table 1), it increases slightly when variable trade costs decrease only
on equipment, which means that the larger ﬁrms get even larger and use a more
skill-intensive mix of factors in production.
When variable trade costs decrease on ﬁnal goods only (table 4), nominal
and real skilled wages do not increase and instead a small decline is observed.
Nominal and real unskilled wages decline too, but by a smaller amount, and thus
the skill premium declines slightly. Moreover, the within-sector variance of the
equipment-unskilled labour ratio increases by more than when a decrease in the
price of equipment, either due to lower variable trade costs or cheaper world price,
is simulated (tables 3 and 6). However, in table 4, the increase in the variance
of the equipment-unskilled labour ratio is not caused by large ﬁrms increasing
their demand for equipment but rather by the fact that ﬁrms in the middle of the
distribution move from being domestic producers only to being exporters too. This
33Table 4: Eﬀects of lower variable trade costs on ﬁnal goods in both countries
with immobile labour.
Baseline Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 & 2
τH
n1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
τH
n2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
τH
o1 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4
τH
o2 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4
τF
o1 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4
τF
o2 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4
ws1 1.000 0.710 1.030 0.935
ws2 1.000 1.124 0.967 0.926
ws1/P 28.841 21.150 29.643 28.085
ws2/P 28.841 33.172 27.837 27.808
wu1 0.599 0.499 0.605 0.552
wu2 0.599 0.638 0.585 0.556
wu1/P 17.274 14.819 17.424 16.581
wu2/P 17.274 18.833 16.837 16.701
wi1 (ws1/wu1) 1.670 1.454 1.701 1.693
wi2 (ws2/wu2) 1.670 1.767 1.654 1.665
var(k/u)1 ∗ 100 0.622 0.642 0.625 0.642
var(k/u)2 ∗ 1000 0.480 0.478 0.493 0.489
(s(φ ≥ 3)/s)1 0.771 0.769 0.771 0.769
(s(φ ≥ 3)/s)2 0.242 0.241 0.242 0.241
P 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.033
can be shown in the simulation by examining the share of skilled workers employed
by the largest ﬁrms. Unlike in the case in which a decrease in the price of equipment
is simulated, the largest ﬁrms employ relatively fewer skilled workers, although only
slightly, because new exporters expand by more as they increase signiﬁcantly their
demand for all factors of production due to the new possibilities in the export
market. Therefore, only decreases in the price of equipment, due to lower world
prices or decreases in variable trade costs on equipment, cause exogenous or trade-
induced skill-biased technical change, while trade liberalisation in ﬁnal goods does
not.
34The reason why the variance of the equipment-unskilled labour ratio increases,
even though the share of skilled labour used by the largest ﬁrms decreases, is that
when variable trade costs decrease, more ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to export, which
leads to a smaller export cutoﬀ. This leads to a decrease in average proﬁts that
pushes low-productivity ﬁrms out of the domestic market, thus raising the domestic
cutoﬀ. Therefore, not only there is a substantial reduction in the interval (φ 
id,φ  
ix)
in which ﬁrms produce only for their domestic market, but also the variance of the
equipment-unskilled labour ratio increases substantially, since the new exporters
use equipment more intensively than those ﬁrms that exit the domestic market.
4.2 Alternative possible speciﬁcations
The paper so far has discussed the case of a small developing country that is
unskilled labour abundant. The simulations in the previous section showed that,
even in this case, trade liberalisation can lead to an increase in the skill premium
in a model with equipment as a third factor of production and equipment-skill
complementarity. This occurs even though trade liberalisation for ﬁnal goods tends
to reduce the skill premium, as would be expected in the case of an unskilled labour
abundant country in standard trade theory.
Simulations for the case of a skill-abundant developing country have not been
carried out, but it is fairly clear what they would show. The eﬀect of a decrease
in the price of equipment, due to either lower variable trade costs or a reduced
world price, would still be to increase real skilled wages and therefore the skill
premium, because this eﬀect does not depend on which sector the country has a
comparative advantage in. Moreover, a decrease in variable trade costs on ﬁnal
goods would most likely lead to an increase in the skill premium, for standard
35Stolper-Samuelson reasons (in the simulations for a skill-scarce country a small
decrease is observed). Therefore, the sum of all the eﬀects would be an even
stronger increase in the skill premium.
The empirical evidence in Anderson (2005) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007)
shows that both skill abundant developing countries, such as most Latin Ameri-
can countries, and skill scarce developing countries, such as most East and South-
East Asian countries, have experienced an increase in the skill premium in recent
decades (though the phenomenon is better documented for Latin American coun-
tries). The present model is able to explain this set of facts and it is believed to
be the ﬁrst model to do so in a framework with two sectors, two diverse countries
and, therefore, the possibility of Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects.
Another speciﬁcation change that merits investigation would be to replace the
assumption of perfect complementarity between equipment and skilled labour.
This assumption was adopted because it greatly simpliﬁes the algebra. But in a
more sophisticated model, the equipment-skilled labour ratio would be endogenous.
In such a model, when equipment becomes cheaper, there could be eﬀects pulling
in two directions. Cheaper equipment would allow each skilled worker to use
more of it and hence become more productive and earn more. Cheaper equipment
could also cause it to be substituted for skilled workers, reducing the demand
for them and hence causing them to earn less. But if the plausible assumption of
complementarity is retained, the ﬁrst of these eﬀects would dominate, so the eﬀects
on the relative wage of skilled labour in the present model would be ampliﬁed. The
accompanying increase in the intra-sectoral variance of the equipment-labour ratio
would probably also be ampliﬁed, too.
365 Conclusion
This paper investigates the eﬀects of trade liberalisation and skill-biased technical
change caused by cheaper imported equipment on real and relative wages. Building
on Bernard et al. (2007) and Vannoorenberghe (2008), the paper moves from a
standard trade model with homogeneous ﬁrms and two countries, North and South,
to a monopolistic competition framework with heterogeneous ﬁrms. This more
elaborate model shows that, even in the presence of Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects
pushing in the opposite direction, a decrease in the price of equipment, due to a
decrease in variable trade costs and/or a lower world price, can lead to an increase
in the relative wages of skilled workers. It also shows that, depending on the
assumption about variable trade costs, the increase in relative skilled wages can
be accompanied by an increase in real unskilled wages in a developing country.
Therefore, this model is able to explain the increase in relative skilled wages
that has been documented for many developing countries, regardless of whether
they are abundant in unskilled or skilled labour. This model also allows for the
possibility that real unskilled wages could be increased by trade liberalisation and
cheaper equipment, as apparently has happened in many developing countries.
The model’s explanation of these various empirical facts in a single framework
comes at a cost. Since it is not possible to ﬁnd an analytical solution, the paper has
had to rely on numerical simulations. The numerical solutions provide a sense of
the magnitude of the shocks analysed, but the results generated with them cannot
be deemed general. However, the range of parameter values the results apply to is
likely to be much larger than that actually analysed. To overcome this limitation,
future research should explore an alternative modelling strategy for equipment,
37including its treatment as a capital good rather than an intermediate good. This
research strategy would also make it possible to extend the model from its current
static form into a more dynamic form.
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42Appendix
A Model with per-unit trade costs
This Appendix shows how the main equations change when variable trade costs are
assumed to be “per-unit”, i.e. non-proportional to prices and costs of production,
instead of the standard iceberg form. All equations relative to the domestic market
stay the same and, thus, are not reported again unless necessary. Instead, the
following text focuses on how the equations for the export market change.
Similarly to the case with iceberg trade costs, the proﬁts from selling on the
export market are given by:
πix(φ)=pix(φ)cix(φ) − wsisix(φ) − wuiuix(φ) − rkikix(φ) − fx, (39)
with the only diﬀerence given by the fact that the price of equipment rki = rF
ki+tH
ni,
where t represents per-unit variable trade costs. The goods market equilibrium
implies:
yix(φ)=cix(φ), (40)
because no output is lost during the exporting process, but instead prices have



























As found previously, the price in the domestic market is the marginal cost of pro-
duction times a markup, which is a standard result in models under monopolistic
competition. The price in the export market now includes trade costs, but in ad-
ditive rather than multiplicative form. The term 1
 −1 in front of trade costs implies
that prices do not increase to match the full amount of trade costs and, therefore,
ﬁrms bear some of these costs in terms of lower per-unit proﬁts.
It is possible to deﬁne the cutoﬀ ﬁrm, i.e. the ﬁrm that draws a certain pro-
ductivity φ, produces and just breaks even. The same term φ 
ix is used to deﬁne




Using equations (5), (39) and (42), input use and production level can be derived
44for the cutoﬀ ﬁrm in the export market in each sector:
yi(φ
 








































































The only diﬀerence in this set of equations when using per-unit trade costs is that
trade costs levied on ﬁnal goods now aﬀect directly output and factor use of the
cutoﬀ ﬁrm as they are included in the last term of all the above equations. In
particular, lower international trade costs decrease the price obtained by ﬁrms
and force the cutoﬀ ﬁrm in the export market to produce more to break even.
Having deﬁned the cutoﬀ ﬁrm, production and factor use of each ﬁrm can be
expressed as a function of that of the cutoﬀ ﬁrm in order to simplify the analysis
and to describe the factor use and production schedule for the whole economy.
To ﬁnd an expression for production for the export market, (4) for ﬁrm φ has





















where P is the price index and E is total expenditure in the economy as previously
deﬁned. Using equations (22), (41) and (42), the ratio of export sales to domestic





















This ratio is a positive function of the size of the export market relative to the
domestic market and a negative function of trade costs. Similarly, one can ex-
press production for the export market in terms of the export cutoﬀ and rewrite














Using this expression and (43), production and factor use for the export market
becomes:
































Compared to the case with iceberg trade costs, international trade costs now aﬀect
directly output and factor use for the export market. Lower international trade
costs allow ﬁrms to produce more thanks to lower prices in the export market.
Combined with (39) and (42), the above expressions for production and factor












Trade costs are now included in the expression for proﬁts in the export market in
such a way that lower trade costs increase proﬁts as they allow to set a lower price
and produce more.





















Even though trade costs now enter additively rather than multiplicatively, it is still
the case that the interval (φ 
id,φ  
ix) in which ﬁrms only produce for their domestic
market increases with higher variable trade costs.
All the other assumptions used to ﬁnd an equilibrium in this model with iceberg
variable trade costs still apply, which implies that the equilibrium conditions do
not change except for those relating to the export market, such as (55).
47B Additional tables
Table 5: Eﬀects of general trade liberalisation in diﬀerent sectors with immobile
labour.
Baseline Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 & 2
τH
n1 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4
τH
n2 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4
τH
o1 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4
τH
o2 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4
τF
o1 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4
τF
o2 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4
ws1 1.000 0.797 1.054 1.017
ws2 1.000 1.101 0.979 0.976
ws1/P 28.841 23.794 30.499 30.667
ws2/P 28.841 32.605 28.349 29.471
wu1 0.599 0.496 0.611 0.546
wu2 0.599 0.631 0.566 0.541
wu1/P 17.274 14.777 17.691 16.536
wu2/P 17.274 18.696 16.377 16.379
wi1 (ws1/wu1) 1.670 1.617 1.725 1.849
wi2 (ws2/wu2) 1.670 1.748 1.729 1.794
var(k/u)1 ∗ 100 0.622 0.642 0.622 0.647
var(k/u)2 ∗ 1000 0.480 0.479 0.514 0.490
(s(φ ≥ 3)/s)1 0.771 0.764 0.771 0.764
(s(φ ≥ 3)/s)2 0.242 0.242 0.223 0.223
P 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.033
48Table 6: Eﬀects of a decrease in the world price of equipment with immobile
labour.
Baseline Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 & 2
rF
k1 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9
rF
k2 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9
ws1 1.000 1.097 0.951 1.093
ws2 1.000 0.969 1.117 1.078
ws1/P 28.841 32.329 28.107 32.366
ws2/P 28.841 28.618 32.920 31.936
wu1 0.599 0.580 0.581 0.578
wu2 0.599 0.588 0.587 0.575
wu1/P 17.274 17.122 17.152 17.169
wu2/P 17.274 17.350 17.331 17.060
wi1 (ws1/wu1) 1.670 1.887 1.639 1.884
wi2 (ws2/wu2) 1.670 1.649 1.900 1.870
var(k/u)1 ∗ 100 0.622 0.626 0.626 0.626
var(k/u)2 ∗ 1000 0.480 0.480 0.481 0.481
(s(φ ≥ 3)/s)1 0.771 0.772 0.771 0.772
(s(φ ≥ 3)/s)2 0.242 0.242 0.243 0.243
P 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.034
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